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Abstract
A value function for cooperative games with transferable utility assigns to every game a distribution of the payoffs. A value
function is efﬁcient if for every such a game it exactly distributes the worth that can be obtained by all players cooperating together.
An approach to efﬁciently allocate the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ is using share functions which assign to every game a vector
whose components sum up to one. Every component of this vector is the corresponding players’ share in the total payoff that is to
be distributed. In this paper we give characterizations of a class of share functions containing the Shapley share function and the
Banzhaf share function using generalizations of potentials and of Hart and Mas-Colell’s reduced game property.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A situation in which a ﬁnite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative
game with transferable utility—or simply a TU-game—being a pair (N, v), where N ⊂ N is a ﬁnite set of players and
v: 2N → R is a characteristic function on 2N such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N , the real number v(S) is
the worth of coalition S, i.e., the members of coalition S can obtain a total payoff of v(S) by agreeing to cooperate. We
denote the collection of all TU-games by G.
For a set S ⊆ N we denote by |S| the number of players in S. A value function on a class of games C ⊆ G is a
function f that assigns to every (N, v) ∈ C an |N |-dimensional real vector f (N, v) ∈ R|N | representing a distribution
of payoffs among the players. A value function f is efﬁcient on C ⊆ G if for every game in C it exactly distributes the
worth v(N) of the ‘grand coalition’, i.e., if
∑
i∈Nfi(N, v) = v(N) for every (N, v) ∈ C.
An approach to efﬁciently allocating the worth v(N) is the concept of share function as introduced in van der Laan
and van den Brink [15]. A share vector for game (N, v) ∈ G is an |N |-dimensional real vector  ∈ R|N | such that∑
i∈Ni = 1. Here i is player i’s share in the total payoff that is to be distributed among the players. A share function
onC ⊆ G is a function  that assigns to every (N, v) ∈ C exactly one share vector (N, v) ∈ {x ∈ R|N | | ∑i∈Nxi =1}.
In van der Laan and van den Brink [15] a class of share functions that generalizes the Shapley- and the Banzhaf
share function is characterized. The Shapley share function is deﬁned on the class of games (N, v) for which v(N) = 0
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and is obtained by normalizing the Shapley value [22] to one. The Banzhaf share function is obtained by normalizing
the Banzhaf value [1,17,11] to one. It is very useful to see to what extent results for value functions can be adapted
and generalized to share functions, since share functions seem to be more easy solutions. For example, the Banzhaf-
and normalized Banzhaf value (which distributes the worth v(N) proportional to the Banzhaf values of the players,
and is axiomatized in van den Brink and van der Laan [2]) are very different value functions. In particular, the (non-
efﬁcient) Banzhaf value satisﬁes linearity and the dummy player property, which are not satisﬁed by the (efﬁcient)
normalized Banzhaf value. However, they correspond to the same Banzhaf share function. Another main advantage of
share functions has been discovered by Pekec [19] who shows that on a ratio scale meaningful statements can be made
for a certain class of share functions, whereas all statements with respect to value functions are meaningless.1 As it
turns out this class contains the share functions considered in this paper. Further, share functions have been successfully
applied to games in a priori coalition structure in van den Brink and van der Laan [5].
The purpose of this paper is to study how far results on potentials and reduced games for value functions can be
adapted and generalized to share functions. The characterization mentioned above uses the so-called -functions which
evaluate TU-games by assigning to every game a real number. In this paper, we ﬁrst generalize the concept of potential
function as introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell [13,14] who show that there is a unique potential function and that for
every game its vector of marginals coincides with the Shapley value. We show how the generalized class of share
functions mentioned above can be characterized as the normalized marginal shares of a generalized potential function
under a new assumption for -functions. This new assumption is refered to as null player independence and states that
deleting a null player from a game does not change the -value assigned to the game.
Hart and Mas-Colell [13,14] also use reduced games in characterizing the Shapley value, and Dragan [8,9] does
the same in characterizing the Banzhaf value. We also study under what assumptions these results can be adapted and
generalized for share functions. First, we show that linearity and positivity for unanimity games of the -function are
sufﬁcient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the reduced game. To obtain the characterization result we
also need the -function to be symmetric and null player independent. Moreover, the class of games for which results
can be obtained must be closed under some operation that depends on the -function. This is rather surprising since in
characterizing core concepts for share vectors using reduced games, van den Brink and van der Laan [4] did not need
these extra assumptions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give some preliminaries on TU-games and share functions. In
Section 3 we generalize potential functions and characterize a class of share functions by considering the normalized
marginal share functions of these generalized potential functions. In Section 4 we give a characterization of this class
using reduced games. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks and related literature.
2. Preliminaries on TU-games and share functions
For given game (N, v) ∈ G and T ⊆ N , the subgame (T , vT ) is given by vT (S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ T . The
class C ⊆ G is subgame closed if (T , vT ) ∈ C for all (N, v) ∈ C and T ⊆ N . A game (N, v) is a null game if
v = v0 with v0(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N . For given N ⊂ N, nonempty T ⊆ N , and  = 0 the scaled unanimity game
(N, uT ) is given by uT (S) =  if T ⊆ S, and uT (S) = 0 otherwise. If  = 1 we call this just the unanimity game
of coalition T. The marginal contribution of player i ∈ N to coalition S ⊆ N in TU-game (N, v) ∈ G is denoted by
miS(N, v) = v(S) − v(S\{i}).
Let :G → R be a function assigning a real number to any (N, v) ∈ G. The numbers that are assigned to games by
the function  can be applied when evaluating games. To give an example, consider the widely applied linearity property
for value functions stating that on some class of games2 C ⊆ G, f (N, v + w) = f (N, v) + f (N,w) for every
pair of games (N, v), (N,w) ∈ C and ,  ∈ R such that (N, v+w) ∈ C. As mentioned in the Introduction, a share
function on a class of games C ⊆ G is a function  that assigns to every (N, v) ∈ C a |N |-dimensional vector (N, v)
with the sum of its components equal to one. Clearly, for share functions linearity does not make sense since adding
share vectors yield vectors that do not add up to one. Instead, when taking linear combinations of games, we need to
take some convex combination of the share vectors of the two games to get a share vector for the combined game. The
1 A statement P[N, v] for a TU-game (N, v) is meaningful on a ratio scale if the statement is also true if we multiply the relevant variables by
the same constant. For details see Pekec [19].
2 For every pair of games (N, v), (N,w) ∈ G and ,  ∈ R the game (N, v + w) is given by (v + w)(S) = v(S) + w(S),S ⊆ N .
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-functions can be used in determining these convex combinations. To do so, we require that the -functions itself are
linear on subclassesC, meaning that (N, v+w)=(N, v)+(N,w) for every pair of games (N, v), (N,w) ∈ C
and ,  ∈ R such that (N, v+w) ∈ C. Then, for a linear function :G → R, we say that a share function  satisﬁes
-linearity on C if (N, v + w)(N, v + w) = (N, v)(N, v) + (N,w)(N,w) for every pair of games
(N, v), (N,w) ∈ C and ,  ∈ R such that (N, v + w) ∈ C. For a linear function , the property of -linearity says
that (N, v+w) is a convex combination of (N, v) and (N,w) and thus is also a share vector when the latter two
are share vectors. It therefore adapts the concept of linearity of value functions to share functions. Observe that, deﬁning
f (N, v) = (N, v)(N, v), the -linearity yields the standard linearity f (N, v + w) = f (N, v) + f (N,w) for
value functions.
Besides the linearity, we require the following properties for -functions.A function :G → R is positive onC ⊆ G
if (N, v)> 0 for all (N, v) ∈ C, and it is called zero on C ⊆ G if (N, v) = 0 for all (N, v) ∈ C. By G+ ⊆ G,
respectively, G0 ⊆ G, we denote the class of games on which  is positive, respectively, zero. Moreover, we deﬁne
G =G+ ∪G0 and for C ⊆ G we denote C+ =C∩G+ and C0 =C∩G0. For a subgame closed class C ⊆ G, we call
:G → R symmetric on C if (S\{i}, vS\{i}) = (S\{j}, vS\{j}) for every pair of symmetric players3 i, j in (N, v)
and every S ⊆ N containing {i, j}.
Above we already mentioned the property of -linearity for share functions. We also use two properties for share
functions that are the same as the corresponding properties for value functions. A share function  satisﬁes the null
player property on C if i (N, v) = 0 for every null player4 i in (N, v) ∈ C. A share function  satisﬁes symmetry on
C if i (N, v) = j (N, v) for every pair i, j of symmetric players in (N, v) ∈ C.
For given function , van der Laan and van denBrink [15] characterize the corresponding share function  on classes
of games C ⊆ G+ . The next theorem slightly extends this result for classes C ⊆ G, so including games for which 
can be zero. For such games we need to introduce the equal share property on C ∩G0 stating that i (N, v) = 1|N | for
all i ∈ N if (N, v) = 0.
Theorem 2.1. Let :G → R and let C ⊆ G be subgame closed and contain all unanimity games. When  is linear
and symmetric on C, then there exists a unique share function  on C satisfying symmetry, -linearity and the null
player property on C ∩ G+ , and the equal share property on C ∩ G0.
The proof is similar as for the result in van der Laan and van den Brink [15] on G+ , see also van den Brink and
van der Laan [3], and is therefore omitted. Note that the equal share property implies that symmetry is satisﬁed on the
whole class C. However, -linearity and the null player property are satisﬁed only on C ∩ G+ .
Examples of linear and symmetric -functions are the function S :G → R given by S(N, v)=v(N), and B :G →
R given by B(N, v) = 12|N |−1
∑
S⊆N
∑
i∈SmiS(N, v) = 12|N |−1
∑
S⊆N(2|S| − |N |)v(S). Applying S in Theorem 2.1
yields the Shapley share function S on GS which for every i ∈ N is given by Si (N, v) = Shi (N,v)v(N) if (N, v) ∈ G+S ,
and Si (N, v) = 1|N | if (N, v) ∈ G0S , where Sh(N, v) denotes the Shapley value [22] of (N, v), i.e., Shi (N, v) =∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
(|S|−1)!(|N |−|S|)!
|N |! m
i
S(N, v) for all i ∈ N . Applying B to Theorem 2.1 yields the Banzhaf share function B
on GB which for every i ∈ N is given by Bi (N, v) = i (N,v)∑
j∈Nj (N,v)
if (N, v) ∈ G+B , and Bi (N, v) = 1|N | if (N, v) ∈
G0B , where (N, v) denotes the Banzhaf value [1,17,11] of game (N, v), i.e., i (N, v) = 12|N |−1
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}miS(N, v)
for all i ∈ N . The same share function is obtained by taking the normalized Banzhaf value  which is given by
(N, v) = v(N)∑
j∈Nj (N,v)
(N, v) and is axiomatized in van den Brink and van der Laan [2]. Other examples are the
functions T (N, v)=∑i∈NmiN(N, v) and DP (N, v)= 12|N |−1∑S⊆Nv(S). The corresponding solutions are related to(but not the same as) the share functions corresponding to the -value [24], respectively the Deegan–Packel value [7],
see van der Laan and van den Brink [15].
3 Players i, j ∈ N are symmetric in (N, v) ∈ G if v(T \{i}) = v(T \{j}) for all T ⊆ N with {i, j} ⊆ T .
4 Player i ∈ N is a null player in (N, v) ∈ G if v(S) = v(S\{i}) for all S ⊆ N .
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3. Potential functions
In this section we take another approach to share functions by generalizing the concept of potential functions as
introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell [13,14] using -functions as mentioned in the previous section.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let C ⊆ G be subgame closed. Then, for given :G → R, a function P :C → R is a -potential
function on C if P (N, v) = 0 whenever N = ∅, and
∑
i∈N
(P (N, v) − P (N\{i}, vN\{i})) = (N, v)
for every (N, v) ∈ C with N = ∅. The corresponding marginal function DP on C is given by
DPi (N, v) = P (N, v) − P (N\{i}, vN\{i}), i ∈ N . (1)
If we take the -function as S(N, v) = v(N), then the corresponding -potential function P S is the Hart and
Mas-Colell potential function, and the corresponding marginal function is the Shapley value. The generalization given
in Deﬁnition 3.1 includes potential functions as considered in e.g., Calvo and Santos [6] and Dragan [10] who, for
given value function , take (N, v) =∑i∈Ni (N, v). An essential difference with our approach is that in theirs
the potential is related to a solution (in particular a value function), while this is not the case in the deﬁnition of a
-potential function above.
For :G → R, in the remainder of this section we restrict our analysis to subgame closed subsets C ⊆ G.
For a -potential function P  on C ⊆ G, we deﬁne the normalized marginal share function NDP on C
by
NDPi (N, v) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
DPi (N, v)
(N, v)
if i ∈ N, (N, v) ∈ C+ = C ∩ G+ ,
1
|N | if i ∈ N, (N, v) ∈ C
0 = C ∩ G0.
(2)
Next we adapt and generalize Hart and Mas-Colell’s result and characterize -potential functions. We only consider
functions  that assign the value zero to null games.
Theorem 3.2. Let :G → R with (N, v0) = 0 and let C ⊆ G be subgame closed. Then there exists a unique
-potential function P  on C. This function is given by
P (N, v) =
∑
S⊆N
|N |(|S|) · (S, vS), (3)
where n(s) = (s−1)!(n−s)!n! for all n ∈ N, s = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. Uniqueness of P (N, v) follows similar as in Hart and Mas-Colell [14]. When N = ∅, then (N, v) is a null
game and P (N, v) = 0 follows from (N, v0) = 0. When |N |1, then the potential P (N, v) follows recursively
from the equation in Deﬁnition 3.1 and is given by P (N, v) = 1|N |
(
(N, v) +∑i∈NP (N\{i}, vN\{i})).
Next we prove the explicit formula (3) by induction on |N |. If |N | = 1 then P (N, v) = 1|N |(N, v) = (N, v) =
1(1)(N, v). Proceeding by induction assume that P (N ′, v′) =
∑
S⊆N ′|N ′|(|S|) · (S, v′S) whenever |N ′|< |N |.
Since for every n ∈ N, s = 1, 2, . . . , n − 2, n − 1, we have the relationship
(
n − s
n
)
· n−1(n) = n(s)
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it follows with the induction hypothesis that
P (N, v) = 1|N |
(
(N, v) +
∑
i∈N
P (N\{i}, vN\{i})
)
= 1|N |(N, v) +
1
|N |
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|N |−1(|S|) · (S, vS)
= |N |(|N |) · (N, v) +
n−1∑
k=1
∑
{S⊆N ||S|=k}
|N | − k
|N | · |N |−1(k) · (S, vS)
=
∑
S⊆N
|N |(|S|) · (S, vS). 
Next we relate the share function  to the corresponding normalized marginal share function of P  and to the
Shapley share function of a transformed game. In order to do that we need to introduce a new assumption with respect
to -functions which states that deleting a null player from a game does not change the value assigned by the -function.
Deﬁnition 3.3. The function :G → R is null player independent on the subgame closed class C ⊆ G if (N, v) =
(N\{i}, vN\{i}) whenever i is a null player in (N, v) ∈ C.
Note that the four speciﬁc -functions mentioned at the end of Section 2 are all null player independent. It follows
that for every additive, symmetric, null player independent -function on a subgame closed set C ⊆ G, the share
vector (N, v) is equal to the vector of normalized marginal shares of P  and also equal to the vector of Shapley
shares of the transformed game (N, v) deﬁned by v(S) = (S, vS) for all S ⊆ N .5
Theorem 3.4. Let :G → R with (N, v0)= 0 and let C ⊆ G be subgame closed. If  is linear, symmetric and null
player independent on C, then (N, v) ∈ GS and (N, v) = NDP(N, v) = S(N, v) for every (N, v) ∈ C.
Proof. Let (N, v) ∈ C ⊆ G. Since S(N, v) = v(N) = (N, v)0, it follows that (N, v) ∈ GS .
Next we ﬁrst show that NDP(N, v) = S(N, v). Since for every n ∈ N, s = 2, 3, . . . , n − 1, n, we have the
relationship
n−1(s − 1) − n(s − 1) = n(s),
it follows with (1) and (S, vS) = 0 for S = ∅ that
DPi (N, v) = P (N, v) − P (N\{i}, vN\{i})
=
∑
S⊆N
|N |(|S|) · (S, vS) −
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|N |−1(|S|) · (S, vS)
=
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
|N |(|S|) · v(S) +
∑
{S⊆N |i /∈S}
(|N |(|S|) − |N |−1(|S|)) · v(S)
=
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
|N |(|S|) · v(S) +
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
(|N |(|S| − 1) − |N |−1(|S| − 1)) · v(S\{i})
=
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
|N |(|S|) · (v(S) − v(S\{i})) = Shi (N, v).
5 Note that this game generalizes the auxiliary game in Calvo and Santos [6] which is related to a particular value function by assigning to every
coalition S in a game the sum of payoffs of the players in S in that game according to the given value function.
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Table 1
-functions of Example 3.5
(S, vS) {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
S(S, vS) 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
B(S, vS) 0 0 0 1 0 0 74
DP (S, vS) 0 0 0 12 0 0
3
4
T (S, vS) 0 0 0 2 0 0 5
Then, with (2) it follows that
NDPi (N, v) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Shi (N, v)
v(N)
if i ∈ N, (N, v) ∈ C+,
1
|N | if i ∈ N, (N, v) ∈ C
0,
(4)
showing that NDP(N, v) = S(N, v).
To show that NDP is equal to  on C, by Theorem 2.1 it is sufﬁcient to show that NDP is a share function that
satisﬁes symmetry, -linearity and the null player property onC+, and the equal share property onC0.We do this using
Eq. (4).
NDP being a share function follows immediately from efﬁciency of the Shapley value and (4).
If i, j ∈ N are symmetric players in (N, v) ∈ C+, then symmetry of  on C implies that i and j are symmetric in
(N, v), and thus Shi (N, v) = Shj (N, v) by symmetry of the Shapley value. But then NDPi (N, v) = NDPj (N, v)
by (4).
To show the -linearity of NDP onC+, observe from the linearity of  that for (N, v), (N,w) with (N, v+w) ∈
C+, we have that (v+w)(S)=(S, (v+w)S)=(S, vS +wS)=(S, vS)+(S,wS)=v(S)+w(S)
for all S ⊆ N , showing that (v + w) = v + w. By the linearity of the Shapley value we then have with (4)
that (N, v + w)NDP(N, v + w)= Sh(N, (v + w))= Sh(N, v + w)= Sh(N, v)+ Sh(N,w)=
(N, v)NDP(N, v) + (N,w)NDP(N,w).
Finally, let i ∈ N be a null player in (N, v) ∈ C+. Then the assumption of null player independence of  implies
that i is a null player in (N, v), and thus Shi (N, v) = 0 by the Shapley value satisfying the null player property. By
(4) we then have NDPi (N, v) = 0 if (N, v) ∈ C+.
Obviously from (4) it follows that NDP satisﬁes the equal share property on C0, which completes the proof. 
Under the additional assumption of null player independence of the function , the proof of Theorem 3.4 shows
that the unique share function  to which Theorem 2.1 refers is given explicitly by the Shapley share function of the
transformed game (N, v). In general, there is no explicit formula for the unique share function  available. However
Theorem 3.2 shows that the corresponding potential functions are interrelated in that P (N, v) = P S (N, v) for any
:G → R. We illustrate Theorem 3.4 with an example.
Example 3.5. Let (N, v) ∈ G be given by N = {1, 2, 3} and v = u{1,2} + u{1,2,3}, i.e.,
v(S) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if S ∈ {{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}},
1 if S = {1, 2},
2 if S = {1, 2, 3}.
The -functions mentioned at the end of Section 2 are represented in Table 1.Applying Theorem 3.4 yields S(N, v)=
1
12 (5, 5, 2), 
B(N, v)=S(N, vB )= 17 (3, 3, 1),
DP
(N, v)=S(N, vDP )= 19 (4, 4, 1), and
T
(N, v)=S(N, vT )=
1
5 (2, 2, 1).
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4. Reduced games
In case the function :G → R is positive and linear on C ⊆ G then the condition of -linearity of a share function
 can be rewritten as
(N, v + w) = (N, v)
(N, v) + (N,w)(N, v) +
(N,w)
(N, v) + (N,w)(N,w). (5)
So, in this case the condition states that (N, v + w) is a convex combination of (N, v) and (N,w) with weights
depending on . In other words, if we take a weighted sum of two games (N, v), (N,w) ∈ C (with (N, v+w) ∈ C),
then the shares in the weighted sum game are obtained as a weighted average of the shares in the separate games
(N, v) and (N,w). It seems reasonable to assign different weights in different situations.What weights are appropriate
depends on the application in mind.
Next we want to apply -functions as such weights assigned to reduced games. Given a game (N, v), a reduced
game describes a game situation on a player set T ⊆ N when the players in T c : =N\T leave the game. Question is
how to deﬁne the worths of the coalitions of remaining players given the original game and the payoffs that are taken
by the leaving players. In the literature various reduced games can be found. Instead of directly deﬁning a reduced
game we answer the question how the weights (applicable in weighing games when taking convex combinations as in
(5)) should be adapted. We denote by (T , vT ,,) the reduced game that results after the players in T c leave the game
(N, v) with payoffs determined by a share function . Given weight (N, v) we assign to this reduced game a weight
proportional to the shares assigned to the players in T in the weight of (N, v), i.e.,
(T , vT ,,) = (N, v)
∑
j∈T
j (N, v).
Observing that N = T ∪ T c and v = vN = vT∪T c , similarly we assign to all subgames (S, vT ,,S ), S ⊆ T , S = ∅, of
this reduced game weights proportional to the shares of the corresponding players in S in the weight of the subgame of
(N, v) in which the players in S cooperate with the players in T c, i.e.,
(S, vT ,,S ) = (S ∪ T c, vS∪T c )
∑
j∈S
j (S ∪ T c, vS∪T c ), S ⊆ T , S = ∅. (6)
Deﬁning vT,,(∅) = 0, we refer to the game (T , vT ,,) that is implicitly deﬁned by (6) as the HM-(, )-reduced
game for given share function , function :G → R, game (N, v) ∈ G and nonempty set T ⊆ N . However, this game
need not exist.
So, we ﬁrst have to consider the existence of HM-(, )-reduced games. From Hart and Mas-Colell [13,14] it
follows that the HM-(S, S)-reduced games (T , vT ,S ,S ) exist and are uniquely determined on G. Indeed, taking
(N, v) = S(N, v) = v(N) and = S yields that
v
T,S ,S
E (E) = S(E ∪ T c, vE∪T c )
⎛
⎝∑
j∈E
Sj (E ∪ T c, vE∪T c )
⎞
⎠
= v(E ∪ T c)
⎛
⎝1 − ∑
j∈T c
Sj (E ∪ T c, vE∪T c )
⎞
⎠
= v(E ∪ T c)
⎛
⎝1 − ∑
j∈T c
Shj (E ∪ T c, vE∪T c )
v(E ∪ T c)
⎞
⎠
= v(E ∪ T c) −
∑
j∈T c
Shj (E ∪ T c, vE∪T c )
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for all E ⊆ T ,E = ∅, whenever v(E ∪ T c) = 0, which is exactly Hart and Mas-Colell’s reduced game with respect to
the Shapley value. Similar, taking(N, v)=B(N, v)= 12|N |−1
∑
E⊆N
∑
i∈E miE(N, v)= 12|N |−1
∑
E⊆N(2|E|−|N |)v(E)
as given at the end of Section 2, and = B yields that
B(E, vT,
B,B
E ) = B(E ∪ T c, vE∪T c )
⎛
⎝∑
j∈E
Bj (E ∪ T c, vE∪T c )
⎞
⎠
= B(E ∪ T c, vE∪T c )
⎛
⎝1 − ∑
j∈T c
Bj (E ∪ T c, vE∪T c )
⎞
⎠
= B(E ∪ T c, vE∪T c ) −
∑
j∈T c
j (E ∪ T c, vE∪T c )
for all E ⊆ T ,E = ∅, whenever B(E∪T c, vE∪T c ) = 0, which is the same relation that implicitly deﬁnes the reduced
game with respect to the Banzhaf value in Dragan [8,9].
In general, both the existence and uniqueness result do not hold, i.e., for arbitrary chosen share function  on G and
function :G → R the HM-(, )-reduced game might not exist or not be unique. For example, take N = {1, 2, 3},
T = {1, 2} and  = S . Then the HM-(, S)-reduced game does not exist for the game v = u{3} + u{1,2} when
(N, v) =∑i∈N v({i}). Also, the reduced game is not uniquely determined for the game v = u{3} when (N, v) =
maxS⊆N v(S) since in that case all games (T , v) with v({i})=0, i=1, 2 and v(T )=v({1, 2})0 satisfy the conditions
for being the HM-(, S)-reduced game (T , vT ,,S ). However, existence and uniqueness are guaranteed if  is linear
on G and is positive for all unanimity games. To prove the next theorem, we recall from Harsanyi [12] that the
characteristic function v of a game (N, v) can be expressed as v =∑{S⊆N |S =∅} 	v(S)uS , with the dividends 	v(S)
given by 	v(S) =∑F⊆S(−1)(|S|−|F |)v(F ).
Theorem 4.1. Let  be a share function on G and let :G → R be linear on G and positive for all unanimity games.
Then for all (N, v) ∈ G and T ⊆ N , the HM-(, )-reduced games (T , vT ,,) exist and are uniquely determined on
G.
Proof. To show the existence and uniqueness of (T , vT ,,), we prove by induction on |F |, F ⊆ T , that there exist
unique dividends 	vT,,(F ), such that vT,,=
∑
{F⊆T |F =∅} 	vT,,(F )uFT , where for S such that R ⊆ S ⊆ N , (S, uRS )
is the subgame of (N, uR) with respect to S. Observe that for R ⊆ S, (S, uRS ) = (S, uR), i.e., the subgame for S ⊆ N
of a unanimity game is a unanimity game itself for player set S.
For F ⊆ T , we consider the subgame (F, vT ,,F ) of the reduced game (T , vT ,,). If |F | = 1 then linearity of 
implies that
(F, vT ,,F ) = (F,	vT,,F (F )u
F
F ) = 	vT,,F (F )(F, u
F ).
Since (F, uF )> 0 by assumption, it holds that the dividend 	
v
T,,
F
(F ) = (F,v
T ,,
F )
(F,uF ) is uniquely determined. Now,
for every F ⊆ T with |F | = 1 and every S such that F ⊆ S ⊆ T , we set the dividend of F in all subgames
v
T,,
S of the reduced game vT,,, including the reduced game itself, equal to the dividend of F in v
T,,
F , i.e.,
	vT,,(F ) = 	vT,,S (F ) = 	vT,,F (F ) for all F ⊆ S ⊆ T , |F | = 1.
Consider F ⊆ T . Proceeding by induction, suppose we have determined the dividends 	
v
T,,
S
(F ′)=	vT,,(F ′) for
all F ′ ⊆ S ⊆ T with |F ′|< |F |.
By deﬁnition any HM-(, )-reduced game, (T , vT ,,) satisﬁes
(F, vT ,,F ) = (F ∪ T c, v(F∪T c))
⎛
⎝∑
j∈F
j (F ∪ T c, v(F∪T c))
⎞
⎠
.
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Linearity of  implies that (F, vT ,,F ) =
∑
R⊆F	vT,,F (R)(F, u
R
F ), and by (F, u
F
F ) = (F, uF )> 0 it then holds
that
	
v
T,,
F
(F ) =
(F, vT ,,F ) −
∑
{R⊆F |R =F } 	vT,,F (R)(F, u
R
F )
(F, uFF )
=

(
F ∪ T c, v(F∪T c)
) (∑
j∈F j (F ∪ T c, v(F∪T c))
)
−∑{R⊆F |R =F } 	vT,,F (R)(F, uRF )
(F, uF )
.
Since |R|< |F | for all R ⊆ F , R = F , from the induction hypothesis and (F, uF )> 0 it follows that 	
v
T,,
F
(F )
is uniquely determined. Setting 	vT,,(F ) = 	vT,,S (F ) = 	vT,,F (F ) for all S with F ⊆ S ⊆ T , and proceeding by
induction on |T | yields that all dividends 	vT,,(F ), F ⊆ T , exist and are uniquely determined. It therefore holds that
vT,, =∑{F⊆T |F =∅} 	vT,,(F )uF exists and is uniquely determined. 
For given :G → R, in the previous sections we have restricted ourselves to subclasses of G to characterize the
corresponding share function . Although Theorem 4.1 guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the HM-(, )-
reduced game for given  and  being linear on G and positive for all unanimity games, it does not imply that for
such -functions and (N, v) ∈ G also the corresponding HM-(, )-reduced games are in G as is illustrated in the
following example.
Example 4.2. Take  = S and (N, v) = S(N, v) = v(N). Consider the class GS and (N, v) ∈ GS given by
N={1, 2, 3}, v=2u{3}−u{1,2}. ForT ={1, 2}, theHM-(S, S)-reduced game (T , vT ,S ,S )must satisfy vT,S ,S ({i})=
v
T,S ,S
{i} ({i}) = S({i}, vT ,
S ,S
{i} ) = S({i, 3}, v{i,3})Si ({i, 3}, v{i,3}) = v{i,3}({i, 3})Si ({i, 3}, v{i,3}) = 0, i = 1, 2, and
vT,
S ,S (T )= vT,S ,ST (T )=S(T , vT ,
S ,S )=S(N, v)(S1 (N, v)+S2 (N, v))= v(N)(S1 (N, v)+S2 (N, v))=−1.
Thus, S(T , vT ,S ,S )< 0, implying that (T , vT ,S ,S ) /∈GS .
The same can be said about other classes of games such as the class of all monotone games, being games (N, v)
such that v(S)v(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N . For instance for N = {1, 2, 3}, T = {1, 2} and the monotone game
v=u{1,3} +u{2,3} −u{1,2,3}, the HM-(S, S)-reduced game (i.e., the reduced game from Hart and Mas-Colell [13,14])
is not monotone. For given  and , in the following we consider (, )-closed subclasses of the class of games G.
Deﬁnition 4.3. For given :G → R and share function  on G, a subgame closed subset C of G is (, )-closed if
(T , vT ,,) ∈ C for every (N, v) ∈ C and T ⊆ N .
This deﬁnition implies that if C is a (, )-closed subset of G, then for every T ⊆ N it holds that (T , vT )0 and
(S, vT ,,S )0 for all S ⊆ T .
Lemma 4.4. For  linear on G and positive for all unanimity games, and share function  on G, let C ⊆ G be
(, )-closed. Then i (N, v)0 for all i ∈ N and (N, v) ∈ C+ = C ∩ G+ .
Proof. Since C is (, )-closed, (T , vT ,,) ∈ C, and hence (T , vT ,,)0 for every (N, v) ∈ C and T ⊆ N . For
given (N, v) ∈ G+ , take i ∈ N . Applying Eq. (6) for S = T = {i} yields (T , vT ,,) = (N, v)i (N, v). Hence
i (N, v)0. 
The proof of the lemma also implies that C ⊆ G can only be (, )-closed if for every (N, v) ∈ C+ the share
vector is nonnegative. Clearly, when i (N, v)< 0 for some i ∈ N , then ({i}, v{i},,) = (N, v)i (N, v)< 0 and
hence ({i}, v{i},,) /∈C. Note that the conditions on the -function stated in Lemma 4.4 are the same as required for
the existence and uniqueness of all HM-(, )-reduced games in Theorem 4.1.
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We now come to characterizing share functions using a reduced game consistency. For given function :G → R
and given share function , a (possibly different) share function  satisﬁes the HM-(, )-reduced game property
on a subgame closed subset C of G if for any (N, v) ∈ C, T ⊆ N , and every pair of players i, j ∈ T with∑
h∈T h(N, v) = 0, it holds that the ratio of the shares i and j in the HM-(, )-reduced game of coalition T is
equal to the ratio of their shares in the original game.
This reduced game property is considered to be a consistency property when for given function  a share function
 satisﬁes its own HM-(, )-reduced game property. In that case we say that  is HM--consistent. Now, for given
 linear and positive for all unanimity games and given share function , let C be a (, )-closed subset of G. Then
Lemma 4.4 says that for any i ∈ T and (N, v) ∈ C it holds that i (N, v)0. Moreover, this implies that i (N, v)= 0
for all i ∈ T when∑j∈T j (N, v)= 0. We therefore also require that each player i ∈ T gets an equal share in the own
HM-(, )-reduced game (T , vT ,,) when
∑
j∈T j (N, v) = 0.
Axiom 4.5 (HM--consistency). Let :G → R be linear and positive for all unanimity games. The share function 
satisﬁes HM--consistency on a (, )-closed subset C of G if for every (N, v) ∈ C, every nonempty T ⊆ N and
every i ∈ T , it holds that
i (T , v
T ,,) =
{ i (N,v)∑
j∈T j (N,v)
if
∑
j∈T j (N, v)> 0,
1
|T | if
∑
j∈T j (N, v) = 0.
Next we arrive at the following theorem that we need for our characterization result. The ﬁrst part of this theorem
expresses the-potential functions of the subgames of aHM-(, )-reduced game as the difference of potential functions
of subgames of the original game. The second part relates the marginal functions of the reduced games with those of
the original game. Finally, the third part states that  is HM--consistent.
Theorem 4.6. Let :G → R with (N, v0) = 0, be linear, symmetric, null player independent and positive for all
unanimity games. Further, let C ⊆ G be subgame closed and let  be the corresponding share function on C. Then
(i) for all (N, v) ∈ C, T ⊆ N and S ⊆ T such that (S ∪ T c, v(S∪T c))> 0 it holds that
P (S, v
T ,,
S ) = P (S ∪ T c, vS∪T c ) − P (T c, vT c ), (7)
(ii) DPi (T , vT ,,

) = DPi (N, v) for all T ⊆ N , i ∈ T and (N, v) ∈ C,
(iii)  satisﬁes HM--consistency if the class C is (, )-closed and contains all unanimity games.
Proof. (i) We prove part (i) by induction on |S|. If |S| = 0 then both sides of equality (7) are equal to 0. If |S| = 1, i.e.,
S = {i}, then by deﬁnition of a -potential function, Eq. (6) and P (∅, v) = 0 imply that
P (S, v
T ,,
S ) = (S, vT ,,

S ) = (S ∪ T c, v(S∪T c))i (S ∪ T c, v(S∪T c)).
Applying Theorems 3.2 and 3.4, and using Eqs. (1) and (2) this yields
P (S, v
T ,,
S ) = (S ∪ T c, v(S∪T c))NDPi (S ∪ T c, v(S∪T c))
= DPi (S ∪ T c, v(S∪T c)) = P (S ∪ T c, v(S∪T c)) − P (T c, vT c ).
Consider S ⊆ T . Proceeding by induction assume that the equality holds for all (S′, vT ,,) with |S′|< |S|. For every
i ∈ S the induction hypothesis then implies that
P (S\{i}, vT ,,S\{i} ) = P ((S ∪ T c)\{i}, v(S∪T c)\{i}) − P (T c, vT c ).
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Again, with Eqs. (6), (1) and Theorem 3.4 it then follows that
|S|(P (S, vT ,,S ) − P (S ∪ T c, vS∪T c ))
=
∑
i∈S
(P (S, v
T ,,
S ) − P (S ∪ T c, vS∪T c ))
=
∑
i∈S
(P (S\{i}, vT ,,S\{i} )) + (S, vT ,,

S ) −
∑
i∈S
(P ((S ∪ T c)\{i}, v(S∪T c)\{i}))
− (S ∪ T c, vS∪T c ) +
∑
i∈T c
(P (S ∪ T c, vS∪T c ) − P ((S ∪ T c)\{i}, v(S∪T c)\{i}))
=
∑
i∈S
(P (S\{i}, vT ,,S\{i} ) − P ((S ∪ T c)\{i}, v(S∪T c)\{i}))
+ (S ∪ T c, vS∪T c )
∑
i∈S
i (S ∪ T c, vS∪T c ) − (S ∪ T c, vS∪T c ) +
∑
i∈T c
DPi (S ∪ T c, vS∪T c )
=
∑
i∈S
(P (S\{i}, vT ,,S\{i} ) − P ((S ∪ T c)\{i}, v(S∪T c)\{i}))
− (S ∪ T c, vS∪T c )
∑
i∈T c
i (S ∪ T c, vS∪T c ) +
∑
i∈T c
DPi (S ∪ T c, vS∪T c )
=
∑
i∈S
−P (T c, vT c ) = −|S|P (T c, vT c ),
so that P (S, vT ,,

S ) = P (S ∪ T c, vS∪T c ) − P (T c, vT c ).
(ii) LetT ⊆ N and i ∈ T . By applying part (i)withS=T andS=T \{i}, respectively, it follows thatDPi (T , vT ,,

)=
P (T , vT ,,

)−P (T \{i}, vT ,,T \{i} )=P (N, v)−P (T c, vT c )−P (N\{i}, vN\{i})+P (T c, vT c )=P (N, v)−
P (N\{i}, vN\{i}) = DPi (N, v).
(iii) Since  is linear and positive for all unanimity gameswe have byTheorem 4.1 that all HM-(, )-reduced games
exist and are uniquely determined. Since C is (, )-closed we have that (T , vT ,,) ∈ C and hence (T , vT ,,)0
for every T ⊆ N . Now consider some game (N, v) ∈ C. If (N, v)=0 then i (N, v)= 1|N | for all i ∈ N . Furthermore,
(N, v) = 0 implies with Eq. (6) that (T , vT ,,) = 0 and hence i (T , vT ,,

) = 1|T | =
i (N,v)∑
j∈T 

j (N,v)
for all i ∈ T ,
T ⊆ N .
Next suppose that (N, v)> 0. Take T ⊆ N , T = ∅. If ∑j∈T j (N, v) = 0, then it follows from Eq. (6) that
(T , vT ,,

) = 0, and hence i (T , vT ,,

) = 1|T | for all i ∈ T . Otherwise
∑
j∈T 

j (N, v)> 0 and it follows from
Eq. (6) that also (T , vT ,,)> 0. In the last case, for i ∈ T by applying Theorem 3.4 twice, part (ii), and Eq. (6),
respectively, we obtain6
i (T , v
T ,,) = DP

i (T , v
T ,,)
(T , vT ,,)
= DP

i (N, v)
(T , vT ,,)
= 

i (N, v) · (N, v)
(T , vT ,,)
= 

i (N, v)∑
j∈T 

j (N, v)
.
Thus, (N, v) satisﬁes HM--consistency. 
To obtain our ﬁnal characterization result, notice that Hart and Mas-Colell [13,14] characterize the Shapley value
by their reduced game consistency and the property of standardness for two person games, meaning that if N = {i, j},
6 Alternatively, by applying Theorem 3.4 twice, part (ii), and the deﬁnition of the -potential function, respectively, we obtain 
i
(T , vT ,,

)=
DP
i
(T ,vT ,,

)
(T ,vT ,,

)
= DP

i
(T ,vT ,,

)∑
j∈T DPj (T ,vT ,,

)
= DP

i
(N,v)∑
j∈T DPj (N,v)
= 

i
(N,v)∑
j∈T j (N,v)
.
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i = j , then Shi (N, v) = v({i}) + v(N)−v({i})−v({j})2 = 12 (v(N) + v({i}) − v({j})). Clearly, S satisﬁes Si (N, v) =
1
2
(
v(N)+v({i})−v({j})
v(N)
)
= 12
(
S(N,v)+S({i},v{i})−S({j},v{j})
S(N,v)
)
if v(N)> 0. Generalizing this in a similar way as the reduced
game properties yields the following axiom.
Axiom 4.7 (-standardness for two person games). Let :G → R. A share function  is said to be -standard for two
person games on C ⊆ G if for all ({i, j}, v) ∈ C, i = j , it holds that
i ({i, j}, v) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1
2
(
({i, j}, v) + ({i}, v{i}) − ({j}, v{j})
({i, j}, v)
)
if ({i, j}, v)> 0,
1
2
if ({i, j}, v) = 0.
We now state our characterization of share functions  using HM--consistency and -standardness for two person
games.
Theorem 4.8. Let :G → R with (N, v0) = 0 be linear, symmetric and null player independent on G, and positive
for all unanimity games. Then the share function  is the unique share function that satisﬁes HM--consistency and
-standardness for two person games on any (, )-closed subset C of G containing all unanimity games.
Proof. The share function  satisfying the HM--consistency follows from Theorem 4.6, part (iii).
To prove that  is -standard for two person games on any (, )-closed subset C of G containing all unanim-
ity games, let (N, v) ∈ C with N = {i, j}, i = j . By deﬁnition,  satisﬁes -standardness for two person games
if (N, v) = 0. Therefore, consider the case (N, v)> 0. First, suppose that 	v(N) = v(N) − v({i}) − v({j})0.
Since (N, u{j})i (N, u{j}) = 0 (by  satisfying the null player property) -linearity implies that (N, v({j})u{j}) ·
i (N, v({j})u{j}) = 0. Symmetry of  implies that i (N,	v(N)uN) = 12 . From -linearity of  it then follows
that (N, v)i (N, v) = (N, v({i})u{i})i (N, v({i})u{i}) + 12(N,	v(N)uN). By linearity of  we can replace
(N,	v(N)uN) by (N, v) − (N, v({i})u{i}) − (N, v({j})u{j}), yielding that (N, v)i (N, v) = 12 ((N, v) +
(N, v({i})u{i}) − (N, v({j})u{j})). Since j is a null player in (N, v({i})u{i}), it follows from null player indepen-
dence of  that (N, v({i})u{i}) = ({i}, v({i})u{i}) = ({i}, v{i}). Similarly (N, v({j})u{j}) = ({j}, v{j}). Thus,
(N, v)i (N, v) = 12 ((N, v) + ({i}, v{i}) − ({j}, v{j})). If 	v(N)< 0 the result follows in a similar way by using
i (N,−	v(N)uN) = 12 . So,  satisﬁes -standardness for two person games.
Finally, to prove uniqueness, suppose that is a share function onG satisfyingHM--consistency and-standardness
for two person games on a (, )- closed subset C ⊆ G containing all unanimity games. By deﬁnition we have that
(N, v) = 1 if |N | = 1. If |N | = 2 then (N, v) is uniquely determined by -standardness for two person games.
Let (N, v) ∈ C with |N |3. From Lemma 4.4 it follows that i (N, v)0 for all i ∈ N . Since  satisﬁes the
conditions of Theorem 4.1 all reduced games exist and belong to the (, )-closed set C.
If (N, v) = 0, then it follows from Eq. (6) that (T , vT ,,) = 0 for all T ⊆ N . So, for any pair i, j ∈ N , i = j ,
and T = {i, j} it follows with -standardness for two person games that i (T , vT ,,) = j (T , vT ,,) = 12 . From the
HM--consistency and the nonnegativity of (N, v) it then follows that i (N, v) = j (N, v) for any pair i, j ∈ N ,
and hence i (N, v) = 1|N | for all i ∈ N .
If (N, v)> 0 uniqueness can be shown in a similar way as done in Hart and Mas-Colell [14] for the Shapley
value, and Dragan [8] for the Banzhaf value by induction on |N |. We already saw that for |N |2, (N, v) is uniquely
determined. Consider N ⊂ N with |N |3. Proceeding by induction suppose that (N ′, v) is uniquely determined for
any N ′ with |N ′|< |N |. Since  is a share function and thus ∑i∈Ni (N, v) = 1, at least one component of (N, v)
is positive. So, for some i ∈ N , let i (N, v)> 0. Since C is (, )-closed, we have by Lemma 4.4 that (N, v) is
nonnegative and hence it follows that i (N, v) + j (N, v)> 0 for all j ∈ N ′ ≡ N\{i}. Now, take T = {i, j} for some
j ∈ N ′. Then, applying Eq. (6) for T = {i, j} and S = {i} yields that
({i}, vT ,,{i} ) = (N\{j}, vN\{j})i (N\{j}, vN\{j}). (8)
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By the induction hypothesis we have that i (N\{j}, vN\{j}) is uniquely determined and thus also ({i}, vT ,,{i} ) is
uniquely determined. Analogously we have that
({j}, vT ,,{j} ) = (N ′, vN ′)j (N ′, vN ′) (9)
is uniquely determined. Furthermore, we have that
(T , vT ,,) = (N, v)(i (N, v) + j (N, v))> 0.
So, applying the -standardness for two player games to the game (T , vT ,,) with T = {i, j} yields
i (T , v
T ,,) = 1
2
+ ({i}, v
T ,,
{i} ) − ({j}, vT ,,{j} )
2(T , vT ,,)
= 1
2
+ ({i}, v
T ,,
{i} ) − ({j}, vT ,,{j} )
2(N, v)(i (N, v) + j (N, v))
. (10)
By applying the HM--consistency for T = {i, j} we also have that
i (T , v
T ,,) = i (N, v)
i (N, v) + j (N, v)
. (11)
So, from Eqs. (10) and (11) it follows that for all j ∈ N ′ = N\{i} it holds that
1
2
+ ({i}, v
{i,j},,
{i} ) − ({j}, v{i,j},,{j} )
2(N, v)(i (N, v) + j (N, v))
= i (N, v)
i (N, v) + j (N, v)
,
which can be rewritten to the system of equations
j (Nv) = i (N, v) +
({j}, v{i,j},,{j} ) − ({i}, v{i,j},,{i} )
(N, v)
, j ∈ N\{i}, (12)
where for all j ∈ N\{i} the ({j}, v{i,j},,{j} ) and ({i}, v{i,j},,{i} ) are uniquely determined by (8) and (9). So, with the
condition
∑
h∈N h(N, v) = 1 system (12) has a unique solution. 
It should be noticed that Dragan [8] already argues that his proof is similar to Hart and Mas-Colell’s but that the
introduction of the Banzhaf reduced game creates some additional problems that have to be solved. We remark that
also going to the more general case of using -transformations created additional problems, which we had to solve.
Besides this generalization, also the adaptation to share functions created problems.Although by using share functions
efﬁciency arises by deﬁnition, this creates complications later in the proof. For example, Dragan [8] derives some
inequalities between payoffs which he shows must be equalities. Although these equalities are not valid in terms of
shares, we have shown that applying HM--consistency yields the shares to be uniquely determined.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper a class of share functions that generalizes the Shapley share function and Banzhaf share function is
characterized using a generalization of the potential function and reduced games as introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell
[13,14] in characterizing the Shapley value (adapted to share functions), and used by Dragan [8,9] in characterizing
the Banzhaf value. Recently potential functions of cooperative games are also related to potential (noncooperative)
strategic form games as formally introduced in Monderer and Shapley [16]. A potential in such a game is a function
that assigns to every strategy proﬁle a real number such that for every player the gain (or loss) of changing from one
strategy to another given a strategy proﬁle is equal to the difference in the potential values of these two strategy proﬁles.
A game in strategic form is a potential game if such a potential function exists. Besides properties on various solutions
for such strategic potential games, Monderer and Shapley [16] connect the Shapley value to such games. Given a value
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function f they introduce for every cooperative TU-game a strategic form game with for every player the strategy set
consisting of two strategies (to join or not to join the game), and payoffs given by some reservation value if the player
does not join, and the payoff according to value function f in the subgame on the set of players that choose to join
the game, if the player chooses to join the game. Then they show that an efﬁcient value function f equals the Shapley
value if and only if for every TU-game the corresponding strategic form game with respect to the value function f is a
potential game. Ui [25] characterizes the class of potential games by showing that a strategic form game has a potential
function if and only if the payoff functions coincide with the Shapley value of a special class of cooperative games.
Potential games have been used in models of coalition formation in cooperative games by Qin [21] and Slikker [23].
Future work will investigate what role share functions can play here. If these results on potential games can be stated
in terms of share functions then we prefer to do that since, as wementioned before, share functions seem to bemore easy
and more meaningful (according to Pekec [19]) solutions than value functions. The results of the underlying paper are
crucial in such an investigation. Another useful application of share functions can be found in cooperative TU-games
in a priori coalition structure as introduced in Owen [18]. Winter [26] applies potentials and reduced games for value
functions to such games in a priori coalition structures. We already mentioned that share functions are successfully
applied to such games in van den Brink and van der Laan [5].A further study of potentials and reduced games for share
functions in games in a priori coalition structure may lead to consistent solutions for such games.
Finally, we mention that van den Brink and van der Laan [4] generalized the Core share mapping as a set-valued
solution (i.e., a solution that assigns to every TU-game a set of share vectors) in a similar way as done in this paper for
point-valued solutions (i.e., solutions that assign to every TU-game a single share vector). They characterize a class
of share mappings containing the Core share mapping using a generalization of Davis and Maschler’s reduced game
consistency as used by Peleg [20] in characterizing the Core. With each share function in the class considered in the
underlying paper there corresponds a share mapping in the class considered in van den Brink and van der Laan [4].
The Core share mapping coincides with what is called the Shapley share core. The class considered also contains the
Banzhaf share core which is related to the Banzhaf share function in a similar way as the Shapley share core is related
to the Shapley share function.
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